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ABSTRACT 
 
This article makes two key claims in succession. First of all, Kant’s own religious hope is 
significantly and studiedly distanced from the traditions of Christianity that he would have received, 
in ways that have not yet been fully, or widely, appreciated. Kant makes an ideal moral community 
the object of our religious hopes, and not the transcendent God of the tradition. Secondly, Kant 
nonetheless has a notion of transcendence at play, but in a strikingly different key to traditional 
Christianity. Both concepts of transcendence, the Christian and the Kantian, deflate, in their own 
distinctive ways, our hopes for politics and history, in a way that can unsettle the certainties, and 
vanities, of both the traditional theologian and the secular Rawlsian. The Christian hope is not the 
same as Kant’s religious hope, and Kant’s hope is religious, and distinct, in origin, depth, and 
ambition, from his more limited hope for politics.  
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‘To the extent that Christianity is taken seriously’, John Rawls reflects, ‘it could have deleterious 
effects on one’s character’ii. Rawls describes himself in his last two years at Princeton as ‘deeply 
concerned with theology and its doctrines’, and had considered going ‘to the seminary’, deciding to 
‘wait until the war was over’. In the ‘last year or so of the war’, ‘all that changed’, and a range of 
Christian doctrines ‘all became impossible for me to take seriously’, not ‘in the sense that the 
evidence for them was weak or doubtful’ but for ‘moral’ reasons, concerning ‘ideas of right and 
justice’iii. 
 
A pronounced strand in Rawls’ critique is the tendency that he found, in ‘Christianity’ (Rawls 
paints  here on a broad canvas) of identifying a particular group, or cause, in history with God’s will 
and power, in a way that offers false and dangerous consolation to believers. Rawls recalls being 
appalled by a sermon given in the field, in 1944, by a military Pastor: ‘he said that God aimed our 
bullets at the Japanese while God protected us from theirs’. ‘Christian doctrine’, Rawls reflected, 
‘ought not to be used for that’iv. This line of criticism, shared by others, and not the less forceful for 
being vague, will be in the hinterland throughout my discussion.  
 
This article makes two key claims in succession. First of all, Kant’s own religious hope is 
significantly and studiedly distanced from the traditions of Christianity that he would have received, 
in ways that have not yet been fully, and widely, appreciatedv. The headline claim will be that Kant 
makes an ideal moral community the object of our religious hopes, and not the transcendent God of 
the tradition. The second claim will be that Kant, nonetheless, has a notion of transcendence at play, 
but in a strikingly different key to traditional Christianity. Both concepts of transcendence, the 
Christian and the Kantian, deflate, in their own distinctive ways, our hopes for politics and history, 
in a way that can unsettle the certainties, and vanities, of both the traditional theologian and the 
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secular Rawlsian. The Christian hope is not the same as Kant’s religious hope, and Kant’s hope is 
religious, and distinct, in origin, depth, and ambition, from his more limited hope for politics. In 
short: where the Christian hopes for another time, the Rawlsian has hopes for this time, and Kant 
hopes to be in a space other than time. 
 
II Kant’s Religious Hope 
 
Some commentators have deflated the content of Kant’s religious hope, effectively identifying it, 
without remainder, as one of Kant’s ‘regulative ideas’, which Kant describes as ‘heuristic fictions’ 
(A 771/B 799), which serve the needs of reason, without claiming the status of true beliefsvi. There 
is some truth to this identification, but also some errorvii. In theoretical contexts, the idea of God is, 
for Kant, merely regulative, a ‘condition of the application of reason to nature’ (A 826/B 854). But 
such regulative belief, Kant insists, should ‘not be called practical’ (A 826/B 854). Whilst ‘there is 
something unstable’ about merely regulative belief in God, because of ‘difficulties that come up in 
speculation’ (A 827/B 855), ‘it is entirely otherwise’, Kant writes, ‘in the case of moral belief’ (A 
828/B 856).  The purpose of the moral law can only be achieved if ‘there be a God and a future 
world’, and Kant claims to ‘know with complete certainty’ that ‘no one else knows of any other 
conditions that can guarantee properly ordered happiness’ (A 828/B 856). ‘I will inexorably 
believe’, Kant writes, ‘in the existence of God and a future life, and I am sure that nothing can 
make these beliefs unstable’ (A 828/B 856; see also A 742-744/B 770-772; CPrR, 5: 4, 108-114, 
121, 125, 134-135; LPR, 28: 1084; OIT, 8: 139; CJ, 5: 546). 
  
Determined exponents of a more deflated Kant may find this article overcommitted to the claim that 
Kant nurtures a genuine religious hope. Nonetheless, the article can, I hope, be profitably travelled 
with, some of the way. On any account of the matter, Kant uses the language of the ‘highest good’, 
and this concept has a certain shape, whatever its epistemic or metaphysical status. The key claim, 
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that Kant’s exposition of the concept of the highest good is explicitly distanced from Christianity as 
he would have received it, can adapt itself variously to inflated or deflated readings of what Kant’s 
religious hope amounts to. This precise wording is important. I have no intention of policing the 
wider application of a concept such as ‘Christianity’, which is rich, porous, shifting, and historically 
multi-faceted, with cultural as well as doctrinal dimensions. Indeed, after Kant, strands of 
Christianity become reconfigured in heavily Kantian terms, such that it requires acts of scholarship 
and imagination in order to appreciate how radically and explicitly Kant moves away from the 
traditions that he himself would have received. I also do not deny the significance of wider 
Christian cultural influences, for example, from Pietism, upon aspects of Kant’s moral formation, 
development and theoryviii. The claim is precisely what it is: that in relation to the concept of the 
‘highest good’, the lynchpin and culmination of Kant’s philosophical theology, Kant distances 
himself, in his written works, from the philosophical and theological claims contained within the 
Christian tradition, as he would have received it.   
 
This distancing from Christianity, as he received it, is not found in Kant’s characterization of the 
divine nature, where what he writes is largely compatible with what the tradition would call the 
‘preambles’ of faith: those aspects of the divine nature that our reason can to some degree approach, 
without the articles of faith that rely upon divine revelation given in scripture. For Kant, practical 
reason ‘inexorably leads to the concept of a single, most perfect, and rational primordial being’ (A 
814/B 842), a being of the ‘highest perfection’, a ‘highest and all-sufficient being’ (A 640/B 668; 
see also A 575-579/B 603-607; A 592-3/B 620-1; A 640/B 668; Coll, 27: 306; CPrR, 5: 140; LPR, 
28: 1033-34; R 6248; MV, 29: 945). In less familiar passages, Kant also aligns himself to a 
distinctively Platonic strand, taken up in part of the Christian tradition, which talks about creation as 
a diffusion of a plenitude of divine goodness. We find this notion, for example, in Aquinas, who 
writes that it is ‘evident from the very nature and definition of the good’ that ‘the good is diffusive 
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of itself and of being’. Such ‘diffusion befits God’, by virtue of which ‘God is the cause of being for 
other things (SCG, 1.37).  
 
Kant invokes a similar notion of divine diffusion in the 1780s, telling us that: 
 
 God cognizes himself by means of his highest understanding as the all-sufficient ground of 
 everything possible. He is most well-pleased with his unlimited faculty as regards all 
 positive things, and it is just this well-pleasedness (Selbstzufriedenheit) with himself which 
 causes him to make these possibilities actual. (LPR, 28: 1061)  
 
Kant relates such a conception of self-cognition and self-diffusion with the category of the highest 
good, writing that the deity ‘although subjectively in need of no external thing, still cannot be 
thought to shut himself up within himself but rather’ must be thought ‘to be determined to produce 
the highest good beyond himself just by his consciousness of his all-sufficiency’ (TP, 8: 280n). 
 
At this point, where we seem close to the Christian tradition, we come across the first, and, in some 
ways, all significant difference. In scholastic theology, the highest good of creation, as the fitting 
diffusion of divine goodness, is always identified, not with a perfect world, but with the beatific 
vision of God enjoyed by the blessed, of which the incarnation, the hypostatic union of God and 
man, is the paradigm and the means. In a way that would be quite alien to Kant’s religious hope, the 
highest good is, above all, Christ, and not Christ as an example of a perfect Kantian, but as a living 
reality with whom we are in relationship, such that through Christ, we can enjoy the life of God in 
the beatific vision. In Aquinas, as Aquinas exegetes the theological tradition, we find a Platonic 
logic of diffusion leading inexorably to Christ: 
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 It belongs to the essence of the highest good (summum bonum) to communicate itself in the 
 highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by “His so joining created 
 nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three - the Word, a soul and flesh”, as 
 Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should 
 become incarnate. (ST, III, 1.1) 
 
The beatific vision, achieved in and through Christ, was, for all scholastic theologians, the ‘highest  
created good’: creation at its highest point, enjoying God’s own self-communication. Such 
perilously generalized assertions about ‘all scholastic theologians’ are made possible by virtue of 
the common core of scholastic theology. To become a Master of Theology in the medieval 
university system, one was required to write an appreciative commentary on Peter Lombard’s Book 
of Sentences. Lombard’s Sentences are largely a compilation of passages from Augustine, who is 
clear that God is the highest uncreated good, and the beatific vision of God the highest created 
good. There are nuances, differences and distinctions within the medieval tradition, about the 
relative priority of our willing or knowing in the beatific vision, about how precisely we might say 
God is ‘seen’, and about whether our desire is satiated, or continuously expanding into God. These 
subtleties need not concern us, though, as the largest differences in scholastic thought about the 
‘highest good’ amount to very little, in comparison to the difference between all of them and Kant’s 
conception.  
 
Kant agrees with the tradition that God, as the ‘Supreme Being’ (OPA, 2: 151), the ‘All of Reality’ 
(A 575/B 603), is the highest uncreated good, or, as Kant puts it, the ‘highest original good’ (A 
810/B 839).  The rupture emerges, though, with Kant’s account of the highest created good, which, 
for Kant, does not revolve around the enjoyment of, and participation in, God. What ‘alone 
constitutes the highest good’, Kant writes in the first Critique is ‘happiness in exact proportion with 
the morality of rational beings, through which they are worthy of it’ (A 814/B 842).   
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The lexical field that Kant explores, when discussing his conception of the highest good, faithfully 
maps onto the terms that are associated, in the medieval tradition, with the concept of the ‘summum 
bonum’. To avoid any arbitrary comparison of scholastic theology with Kant, I will restrict myself 
to discussing Kant’s own lexical choices, which include ‘summum bonum’, ‘beatitude’, the ‘final 
end’ of creation, and the glorification and honoring of God, which in the medieval tradition, are the 
terms associated with the enjoyment of God’s diffusion of God’s goodness. In each case, I attempt 
to understand Kant’s distinctive, and quietly subverting, usage, in relation to the tradition from 
which he receives these categories. Kant’s most dramatic discontinuity with the traditions he 
receives, I will suggest, comes when he rejects the idea that God could be an ‘object’ that is good 
without limit for our will or practical reason, alongside his rejection of the medieval notion of 
divine-human ‘concursus’.  Towards the end of this section, I will dispatch the suggestion that Kant 
might, nonetheless, be a sort of Lutheran.  
 
Let us begin, then, with Kant on beatitude. For Aquinas, beatitude ‘consists only in the 
contemplation of God’, as ‘the ultimate end of man is knowledge of God’ (SCG, III.I, 25.12). In 
discussing the ‘prospect of a future of beatitude’ (eine Aussicht in eine selige Zukunft)’, Kant 
explains that  
 
 This is the expression that reason employs to designate a complete well-being independent 
 of all contingent causes in the world. (CPrR, 5: 123n; see also CPrR, 5: 118) 
 
The precise phrasing here is noteworthy: beatitude ‘is the expression that reason employs’ (CPrR, 
*5: 123). The project of translating the categories of historical revealed religion into the ‘religion of 
pure practical reason’ is not something that Kant only begins in his 1793 text Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason. According to Kant’s translation, beatitude is a state where ‘nature and 
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morals come into a harmony’ (CPrR, 5: 128), where ‘rational beings devote themselves with their 
whole soul to the moral law’ (CPrR, 5: 128). The ‘Christian principle of morals’, he explains, is 
‘not theological’:  
 
 It does not make cognition of God and his will the basis of these laws but only of the 
 attainment of the highest good subject to the condition of observing these laws. (CPrR, 5: 
 129) 
 
Beatitude is the state of undistracted devotion to the moral law. God is needed to support and 
reward the attainment of this state, but we should not overlook the fact that beatitude is no longer, 
as it is for the tradition, itself the ‘cognition of God and his will’.  
 
In the scholastic tradition, the notion of the ‘glorification’ or ‘glory’ of God stands, quite precisely, 
for the enjoyment of the communication of divine goodness, expressed paradigmatically in the 
beatific vision. Kant’s continues his translation project.  He reflects that when thinkers describe the 
‘highest good’ (das höchste Gut), or ‘the end of creation’ (den Zweck der Schöpfung), as ‘the glory 
of God’ (die Ehre Gottes), they have ‘perhaps hit upon the best expression (den besten Ausdruck)’ 
(CPrR, 5: 131), a phrasing which nicely indicates Kant’s self-conscious reconfiguring of the 
tradition: 
 
 For, nothing glorifies God (ehrt Gott) more than what is most estimable in the world, respect 
 for his  command, observance of the holy duty that his law lays upon us, when there is added 
 to this  his magnificent plan of crowning such a beautiful order with corresponding 
 happiness.  (CPrR, 5: 131; see also CJ, 5: 449) 
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Although softly, even piously, put, we note that ‘glorification’ is no longer, at all, the enjoyment of 
God’s self-communication, but, rather, observance of the moral law, met with proportionate 
happiness.  
 
Because God and the highest good are so intimately linked in Kant’s thought, and because Kant 
himself, at times, praises a Christian conception of the highest good in comparison with Epicurean 
and Stoic conceptions, it is easy to get the impression that Kant is following established Christian 
patterns of thought. In part based on such passages, the commentator Frederick Beiser affirms that  
the most ‘striking aspect’ of Kant’s reflections on the highest good, is ‘Kant’s self-conscious 
allegiance to the Christian, indeed Protestant, tradition’: ‘it is a point that cannot be stressed 
enough: Kant saw his ethics as Christine doctrine.’ix  
 
It is true that Kant saw aspects of Christian doctrine as compatible with his ethics, but the difference 
between Kant and traditional Christian patterns of thought with reference to the highest good can be 
summarized precisely: for traditional Christianity the highest good is the communication of God’s 
own being, paradigmatically expressed in the Incarnation and the beatific vision; for Kant, the 
highest good is a state of perfect justice, where happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue, and 
where both virtue and happiness are defined without essential reference to God. Happiness, Kant 
tells us, is ‘the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes 
according to his wish and will’ (CPrR, 5: 124; see also GW, 4: 428, 438), where the wish and will 
of a rational being must be determined to virtue, which consists in following the moral law, such 
that  
 
 Morality consists in the laws of the generation of true happiness from freedom in general. (R 
 7199, 19: 272-73; see also A 809-814/B 837-842) 
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In the Christian conception, God is the central constituent element of the highest created good, as 
that which is enjoyed, known and loved in this state; in Kant’s schema, the highest good is a ‘world 
of intelligences’ acting in ‘accordance with universal and necessary moral laws’ (A 815/B 843). 
God is in this community, certainly, as a sovereign (CPrR, 5: 128-132) and a Holy Will (GW, 4: 
414), but the movement and structure on this conception is horizontal, between rational moral 
agents (of which God is an ideal instance), rather than vertical, between creatures and the creator. 
 
It worth being attentive to the precise terms in which Kant singles out Christianity for praise, in 
contrast to Stoicism and Epicureanism. He writes that: 
 
 The doctrine of Christianity, even if it is not regarded as a religious doctrine, gives on this 
 point (in diesem Stücke) [the relationship between happiness and virtue] a concept of the 
 highest good (of the  kingdom of God) which alone satisfies the strictest demand of 
 practical reason. (CPrR, 5: 127-128) 
 
Kant does not say that Christianity is, as such, true. He says that ‘on this point’ Christianity has 
understood something that Stoicism and Epicureanism do not see, which is that ‘happiness and 
morality are specifically quite different elements of the highest good’ (CPrR, 5: 112), rather than 
happiness being found in the consciousness of one’s morality (as in Stoicism), or in the moralized 
curtailing of one’s desires (as in Epicureanism). The heavy lifting in this claim is done by the term 
‘the strictest demand of practical reason’, in relation to which, when considering the ‘precept of 
morals’, Christianity has an ‘advantage’ over other schools of thought (CPrR, 5: 127*). 
 
Kant’s most dramatic theological move, which, I submit, unambiguously reveals the philosopher 
distancing himself from all previous Christian theology, Lutheran or Catholic, is not where we 
might expect. It is buried in the Groundwork, and in a rather recondite discussion in chapter two of 
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the ‘Analytic’ of the second Critique. In the Groundwork, Kant searches for that which is 
'unconditionally necessary', and for that which can be considered 'good without limitation'. In 
searching for the unconditioned, Kant is looking for a reality or principle that is sufficient, by itself 
and in itself, to move our will. Kant writes that ‘if the will’ seeks the law ‘in a property of any of its 
objects - heteronomy always results’: 
 
 The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object (das Object), by means 
 of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. (GW, II. 4: 441) 
 
We can only understand what Kant is doing here, if we grasp what he means by an ‘object’.  An 
‘object’ can mean any reality whatsoever, of any ontological texture, created or uncreated, and not 
only empirical ‘objects’ or created substances. An ‘object’, in this sense, can be something as 
mundane as a table, but it can also be the ‘essence of poetry’, or the uncreated perfection that is 
God. The ‘essence of poetry’ can be the object of our thought, without being an object. Just so with 
God. When Kant insists that no object, external to the will’s own activity, can be good without 
limit, and so have unconditioned value for our practical reason and will, he means precisely what he 
says: all objects are rejected, no matter how elevated, created or uncreated.  Kant’s departure from 
the theological tradition, lies in his denial that even God could constitute an unconditioned and 
good-without-limitation object for our practical reason and will. No theologian had ever before 
offered a similar denial, or anything close to one. Rather, the universal claim in the prior tradition, 
which we find intact in Kant’s sources such as Leibnizx, is that only God is the proper and final 
‘object’ (obiectus) of our willing and knowing. 
 
Commentators do not always see the drama of Kant’s move here, and focus on Kant’s more obvious 
targets, such as commands, sensations and rewards. But Kant is clear that he rejects all objects that 
could be presented to the will. In the Groundwork, having rejected the more obvious failed 
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candidates for the unconditioned good (pleasurable sensations, rewards, honour and fortune), Kant 
turns to the very ‘principle of perfection’ (GW, II, 4: 444; see also GW, 4: 410; CPrR, 5: 64). Kant’s 
explicit target here is the ‘universal practical philosophy’ of Christian Wolff, where the 
identification of perfection and God is clearxi. In the second Critique, Kant comments that ‘the 
occasioning ground of all the errors of philosophers’, when searching for that which is good without 
limitation, is the search for ‘an object of the will’ (CPrR, 5: 64). The point is that it is not the 
unworthiness of the object that concerns Kant, but the reception of anything external to the will 
whatsoever, because, as Kant writes ‘anything which presents itself as an object of the will...is 
excluded from the determining grounds of the will called the unconditionally good’ (CPrR, 5: 74), 
even when the object is ‘happiness’, ‘perfection’ or the ‘will of God’ (CPrR, 5: 64). Any 
‘principle’, external and prior to the will’s own ‘universal lawgiving’ (CPrR, 5: 64), is 
‘heteronomy’ (CPrR, 5: 64).  
 
Kant’s proscribing of external objects is not disturbed by passages, from the ‘Dialectic’ of the 
second Critique, where Kant identifies the highest good itself as the object of pure practical reason 
and the will. Here he speaks of the ‘highest good’ as the ‘whole object of pure practical reason’ 
(CPrR, 5: 119; see also CPrR, 5: 115, 122, 124, 129). Because, for Kant, the ‘highest good’, for our 
will and practical reason, is not something external, such as God, but is rather the full achievement 
and product of our own universal lawgiving, were it to be, in fact, universal. Even if an external 
object, God, is needed to guarantee the possibility of this, what is hoped for is not itself an external 
object, but the flourishing of our own autonomous lawgiving, where the will ‘has as its object’, 
Kant writes, ‘itself as giving universal law’ (CPrR, 5: 432). 
 
For Kant, freedom is destroyed when the will is moved at all, even if the external object that moves 
the will is ‘perfection’ itself (GW, 4: 410).  ‘Freedom cannot be divided’, Kant insists, such that ‘the 
human being is either entirely free or not free at all’ (R 4229; 17: 467).  Freedom must be a ‘faculty 
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of starting...events from itself, i.e., without the causality of the cause itself having to begin, and 
hence without need for any other ground to determine its beginning’ (Pr, 4: 344; see also A 446/B 
474). This has the implication, for Kant, that if God, who Kant calls an ‘alien cause’ (CPrR, 5: 95; 
see also CPrR, 5: 100-101; ML1 28: 267; R 4221, 4225, 4337, 5121), acts upon our will, our 
freedom is destroyed, where freedom, for Kant, is the ‘inner value of the world’ (V-Mo/Mron, 27: 
1482). Kant has a ‘zero-sum’ conception of the relationship between divine and human action: for 
the human to be free, God must withdraw. Kant explicitly rejects the traditional notion of 
‘concursus’ or ‘concurrence’, whereby divine and human action can be understood, uniquely, as 
running together in a single undivided free action: 
 
 It is not permitted to think of God’s concursus with free actions...If God concurs with 
 morality, then the human being has no moral worth, because nothing can be imputed to him.  
 (DR, 28: 1309; see also R 4748, 5632, 6019, 6118, 6121, 6167, 6169, 6171, 8083, NTV, 28: 
 1207-13; PP,  8: 362, MK2, 28: 811; ML1 28: 347, MD, 28: 648)
xii 
 
In denying concursus, Kant squarely sets his face against medieval theology. And in insisting that 
our true freedom comes from ourselves alone, in relation to the good ‘we ourselves must do’ (Rel, 
6: 53), and where the will has ‘as its object’, not God, but ‘itself as giving universal law’ (CPrR, 5: 
432), Kant also offends the deepest Lutheran instinct that we have no freedom, and no goodness, 
except that which comes as a sheer gift from God. For the Lutheran, our moral transformation 
towards virtue (‘sanctification’), depends entirely upon divine action, and follows from our being 
justified by Christ, and is in no way the cause of this justification. ‘Free will’, Luther writes in the 
Heidelberg Disputation, ‘is dead, as demonstrated by the dead whom the Lord has raised up, as the 
holy teachers of the church say’xiii. For Kant, if there is grace, a ‘divine supplement’, it must come, 
if at all, only consequent upon our own free action, when we have made ourselves ‘antecedently 
worthy of receiving’ the grace (Rel 6:44). In contrast, Luther writes that ‘the person who believes 
 14 
that he can obtain grace by doing what is in him’, ‘adds sin to sin so that he becomes doubly 
guilty’xiv.  
 
All of this is not to deny the significance of the positive ways in which Kant conceives of God 
being involved in upholding and maintaining the state which is the highest good. God is the creator 
and sustainer of noumenal substances (CPrR, 5: 100-102; LPR, 28: 1104). God is the sovereign in 
the Kingdom of Ends, and we should regard all duties ‘as divine commands’ (CPrR, 5: 129), 
although the content of these duties is given in the moral law, which is determined independently of 
the divine will. God as the Holy Will can, unlike us, do no other than follow the moral law (GW, 4: 
412), and will always be, therefore, a first among equals within the moral community of the 
Kingdom of Ends. God as omniscient knows our virtue, and as omnipotent can ensure that 
happiness is appropriately distributed, and as benevolent, will do so (CPrR, 5: 124-125; Rel, 6: 73-
76; CJ, 5: 450*). God provides a supplement to our own moral efforts, in our constantly precarious 
attempts to be good (Rel, 6: 44-53, 173-174), although this can seem to run aground on Kant’s own 
requirements for justice, and for genuinely imputable free moral action. More speculatively, there 
are fragmentary hints in Kant, especially in his final writings, that God is in some sense identified 
with the divinity within us, which is our own legislating and following of the moral law (OP, 22: 
121-22).  
 
All of these strands are important and prima facie evidence of Kant’s genuine religiosity. But all of 
them depart from the central claim of the Christian tradition, which is that God, and not just the 
moral law which God necessarily commands, is the all-satiating end-point and final object of our 
loving and knowing, and where God is, in the technical terms employed here, an external object 
(and so not co-extensive with our own moral law-giving), who nonetheless, and uniquely, acts 
interiorly within creatures, in all they do, in a way that does not violate, but constitutes, their 
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freedom. In relation to this claim, for the traditional theologian, Kant’s God seems awkwardly on 
the outskirts of the Kingdom of Ends, or to disappear entirely within it.  
 
One sometimes find the claim, for instance in John Rawls, that Kant’s conception of the highest 
good is a surviving ‘Leibnizian remnant’ in Kant’s writings, which Kant should have removed, if he 
had been faithful to his own philosophical self-discipline and ethical standardsxv. But when we get 
down to the details, we find that, as with Lutheranism, not much of what Leibniz would affirm is 
left remaining. For Kant, God is not a proper external object for our practical reason and will, and 
loving and knowing God is not our highest good, in contrast to Leibniz’s repeated and traditioned 
assertion that God is the only proper object of our knowing and willing, and where knowing and 
loving God is our final end and our highest good, achieved by God’s concurring action within our 
freedom. ‘God alone is our immediate external object’, writes Leibniz, ‘He alone is our light’xvi, 
where the greatest happiness is when God is the ‘object’ of our lovexvii . What remains, from both 
Leibniz and Luther, are remnants of remnants, gutted of their traditional content, and reconstrued in 
terms that are vividly and emphatically Kant’s own, thoroughly motivated by principles deep in his 
wider philosophy. Kant’s religion is properly Kantian.  
 
Within Kant’s religion of pure practical reason we can find a philosophically well-motivated and, 
on some construals, epistemically disciplined (in Kant’s terms) post-Christian philosophical 
theology. ‘Post-Christian’ in its rejection of core strands of doctrinal commitment, as Kant receives 
them; also, perhaps, ‘pre-Christian’, if we follow the tendrils of some of Kant’s priorities and 
commitments back through Leibniz, and into a renaissance Platonic humanism, which we know to 
have been strong in seventeenth-century Germany, mediated through figures such as Thomasius and 
Scherzer.  Although I cannot do more here than gesture towards it, I would suggest that it is at least 
as illuminating, and probably more charitable, to investigate Kant’s religious hope as an 
epistemically-disciplined and adapted form of Platonism, albeit sometimes dressed in Christianized 
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language, as it is to regard these hopes as a lopped-off, derivative, or heretical schism from 
Christianity. For Kant, as in Platonism, human flourishing involves a deepening participation in a 
structure of reason that transcends the individual and the particular, where reason seeks its resting 
place in the unconditioned. Autonomy, whereby we give ourselves the rational law which is itself 
the shape of our own grasping of the rational law, can be construed as a variant on a perennial 
classical paradigm, whereby that which has unconditioned value is thought thinking itself, and 
rational will willing itself. In the 1790s Kant reflects that ‘a hidden idea of philosophy has long 
been present among men’ (LPE, 29: 9). This hidden idea goes back to ‘the ancient Greek 
philosophers’ whose ‘principal object’ is ‘the destination of man, and the means to achieve it’ (LPE, 
29:9).  The true ‘Idea of the philosopher’, as Kant puts it, is expressed by Plato’s Socrates, as one 
seeking, and never quite reaching, the ‘Idea of wisdom’ (LPE, 29: 8; see also A 314-318/B 271-75). 
This will be a hint that I return to in the final moments of this article. We turn now, though, to a 
consideration of Kant’s hopes for politics and history. 
 
III Kant’s Political Hope 
 
The highest created good, for Kant, is a moral community, a ‘great whole’, a ‘systematic unity of 
ends’ in a ‘world of intelligences’, acting in ‘accordance with universal and necessary moral laws’ 
(A 815/B 843; see also CPrR, 5: 110-113). In the state of the highest created good, we are not 
centrally referred or oriented to the transcendence of God. The notion of ‘transcendence’ derives 
etymologically from the Latin term transcendere, ‘to go beyond’. The concept of transcendence 
need not enter our thought as an absolute presence, possession, and foundation, but can act 
subversively upon all our thinking, by marking a space that ‘goes beyond’ our knowledge, 
experience and competence. Everything that is, can be relativized, and rendered passive and 
dependent, by virtue of the transcendence which goes beyond it.   
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Amongst other things, the Christian notion of ‘transcendence’ draws our attention to God being the 
uncreated and inexhaustible source of all that is created, where every texture of creation is 
equidistantly and totally dependent upon God (who always ‘goes beyond’), and where God is in no 
sense reciprocally dependent upon the creation. My eventual claim will be that Kant does have a 
robust and ethico-religiously relevant conception of the transcendent, that which always and 
everywhere ‘goes beyond’, provided by his transcendental idealism, but that the structure of this 
transcendence, this going-beyond, is significantly different from the Christian tradition which he 
received. There are two groups of commentators, who do not otherwise come together, but who join 
in not seeing this differently structured transcendence in Kant: traditional theologians, especially 
those with an Augustinian strand in their thought, and secular Rawlsians (or at least one Rawlsian, 
Rawls himself).  First of all, I will set out how this shared lack of appreciation for Kant’s differently 
structured transcendence manifests itself. We find that it becomes especially apparent and distorting 
when reflecting upon Kant’s hopes for politics and history. Both the Rawlsian and the Augustinian 
theologian think that Kant has significant faith, using the word advisedly, in human reason and 
progress in history. I show in turn that Rawls celebrates this, whilst the theologian laments it. I then 
move onto consider how Kant’s distinctive conception of transcendence subverts the hopes for 
history and politics imputed to him from both sides. 
 
Having rejected what Rawls calls the ‘Leibnizian remnant’ of the highest good, in Kant’s writings, 
Rawls salvages a ‘reasonable faith’ in the ‘Kingdom of Ends’. Such reasonable faith, Rawls insists, 
‘does require certain beliefs about our nature and the social world’. We ‘must believe’, Rawls 
writes 
  
 that the course of human history is progressively improving, and not becoming steadily 
 worse, or that it does not fluctuate in perpetuity from bad to good and good to bad.xviii  
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Such improvement will lead, Rawls avows, to ‘a peaceful international society (or confederation) of 
peoples, each people organized as a state with some kind of a constitutional representative regime’. 
To ‘abandon this faith’, Rawls insists, is ‘to give up on peace and democracy, and that we can never 
do as long as we affirm both the moral law and human freedom’.xix   
 
It can seem, initially, that Rawls is in continuity with Kant’s own hopes for historical progress, 
when Kant writes that ‘the great artist nature’ brings about progress in historyxx. Kant tracks a 
progression from a state of unsocial sociability, expressed in antagonism and cooperation, which 
generates skill and culture, bringing about both war and ‘the spirit of commerce’. All of this we can 
regard as leading, in the future, to a state of perpetual peace, safeguarded by a cosmopolitan world 
order (IUH, 8:21, 27; PP, 8: 360, 368; TP, 8: 310, and APV, 7: 322). When viewed from a moral 
perspective, Kant calls such progress in history ‘providence’ (IUH, 8:30; PP, 8: 361-62), which 
although not in itself a consideration that justifies belief in God, ‘serves’, as does any indication of 
teleology in nature, as a ‘desired confirmation of the moral argument [for God], insofar as nature is 
thus capable of displaying something analogous to the (moral) ideas of reason’ (CJ, 5: 479; see also 
TP, 8: 308-309; A807/B835)xxi. The ambition for this ‘progress’ can be extended, if we add, to the 
essays on history, Kant’s interpretation of the concept of the ‘church’ in Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Reason Alone. Here Kant construes the notion of the ‘church invisible’ as expressing 
the hope for a universal ‘ethico-civil’ community, a ‘free, universal and enduring union of hearts’ 
(Rel, 6: 102; see also Rel, 6: 94-95). It is understandable that commentators, and not only Rawls, 
ascribe to Kant a confidence in moral progress in history, or, at least, to the notion that legal and 
political progress is in some essential way ‘preparatory’ towards moral progressxxii.  
 
Rawls insists that ‘religious beliefs are not needed’ for his ‘practical faith’ xxiii in progress. We can 
go further. Christian religious belief, at least when containing a strong Augustinian strand, is not 
only not needed, but positively antithetical to such faith. The contemporary theologian Charles 
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Mathewes objects, primarily upon ethical grounds, to Kantian moral arguments for the value of 
faith in God: ‘such arguments’, he complains, ‘suggest that God’s value lies in underwriting, 
orienting, and energizing our moral projects’xxiv, expressed in various forms of belief in progress. In 
contrast, a certain sort of theologian will draw attention to what Karl Barth names as the ‘essential, 
sharp, acid and disintegrating’ absolute ‘distance’ between God and creatures.xxv This distance is 
typically worked out in terms of our temporality. For Augustine, we live ‘in hoc saeculo’, in this 
age (saeculum) or time, from which, etymologically the notion of the ‘secular’ derivedxxvi. The 
‘secular’, in this sense, describes a period of time from the creation until judgement day. We live in 
‘this time’, waiting and enduring for the ‘new time’, the saecula saeculorum, the ‘age of ages’, 
which is brought about not by our efforts and achievements, but by divine action. All our existence 
in ‘this time’, the secular, is structurally limited by imperfection, longing and sin.xxvii  
 
The only appropriate pattern of life within this framework is one understood as ‘peregrinatio’, 
pilgrimage, wandering, or as the contemporary theologian Charles Mathews puts it, ‘enduring’ life 
‘during the world’xxviii . Such ascetic enduring, as Mathews describes it, is a ‘matter of vulnerability 
more than toughness’, about ‘learning to suffer in the right way’xxix. The yearning for 
‘transcendence’, Mathews comments, is ‘typically misunderstood’ (not least by Christians), and 
should not be construed as ‘otherworldly’, in the sense that we are perhaps ‘made for another place 
- a metaphysical Mars, perhaps’, whilst ‘for some obscure reason’ we are ‘trapped in this one’xxx. 
Rather, ‘Christians are not otherworldly, but most fundamentally “other-temporalitied”: “The 
world” is more primordially an era than a place’xxxi. Mathewes talks of living within a ‘tensive 
structure’ of ‘commitment and longing’, where, as much as anything, we must ‘cultivating 
appropriate dissatisfactions’xxxii.  
 
The contrasting and undercutting work done by transcendence can have a sharp edge politically. 
Specifically, it should block the identification of particular groups or causes with God, which 
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Rawls, rightly, found a distressing feature of Christianity ‘in the field’ (‘God aims our bullets’). 
Such a conception of transcendence will undercut any confidence in, or even a hopeful orientation 
towards, historical and political progress. The Augustine commentator Paul Griffiths reflects that an 
approach that emphasizes peregrinatio will find ‘most kinds of political progressivism (the view 
that we can, in this age, significantly improve our politics)’ to be ‘utopian’, such that progressivism 
‘may never be endorsed by Christians’.xxxiii ‘The outcome’, Griffiths writes, of even our best efforts, 
will always be, in a formal sense, exactly the same’: ‘an unpredictable blend of the good and the 
dreadful’xxxiv. 
 
Curiously mirroring the ethical concerns about Christianity, expressed above by Rawls, we find a 
constellation of Christian thinkers, broadly in an Augustinian tradition, begin to articulate a set of 
ethical concerns about Kantian hope: specifically, that it is, in a sense, too religious, or more 
precisely, too religious about what reason and human action can do in hoc saeculo, in the ‘secular’. 
If the theologian was to be mischievously pedantic, she might suggest that Rawls’ Kant risks not 
being ‘secular enough’, according at least to the concept’s eschatological etymology, where the 
significance of ‘this time’, and its local aspirations, are suspended and relativized. Rawls accuses 
Christianity of absolutizing human projects, whilst the theologian finds in Rawls, and Kant, the 
same absolutizing move, with its own peculiar dangers, if and when there is any self-satisfaction at 
having no ‘religious’ beliefs. 
 
Such an alignment of Kant with a religious optimism about moral history is too quick though. It 
pushes, I suspect, Kant into too Christian a mind-set, with the paradigm of moving from one 
temporality into another temporality: from historical progress, into the moral state. If the Rawlsian 
learns that he may miss transcendence more than he expected, the Christian theologian must learn 
that Christianity has no monopoly upon transcendence. We should begin by considering all the 
things that historical progress, for Kant, is not. It is not, or not straightforwardly, moral progress at 
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all. In his essay on Perpetual Peace, Kant affirms that a ‘republican constitution’, which is 
‘completely compatible with the right of human beings’, could be achieved even by a ‘nation of 
devils (if only they have understanding)’ (PP, 8: 366; see also IUH, 8: 26; Rel, 6: 27, 33-34, 93-94). 
This is because the ‘problem’ of founding a state is not concerned with ‘the moral improvement of 
human beings but only the mechanism of nature’, where human beings have to ‘constrain one 
another to submit to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in which laws have force’ 
(PP, 8: 366; see also IUH 8:26; Rel 6: 27, 33-34, 93-94). In 1798 Kant writes that we can never 
observe ‘an ever-growing quantity’ of ‘morality with regard to intention’, but only ever ‘an increase 
of the products of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motives’ (CF, 7: 91). This is because we 
only ever have ‘empirical data (experiences) upon which we are founding this prediction’: 
 
 namely, the physical cause of our actions as these actually occur as phenomena; and not the 
 moral cause. (CF, 7: 91) 
 
Even the ‘realization of the’ ideal of an international ‘cosmopolitan society’, wherein all ‘external 
relations’ are conducted rightfully, could occur ‘without the moral foundation in humanity having 
to be enlarged in the least’ (CF, 7: 92). 
 
Kant tracks this limitation in what we can infer from empirical deeds back to his transcendental 
idealism: the claim that all we can ever experience is the world as it is received through our spatial 
and temporal forms of intuition, where moral freedom, if it exists, and we must presuppose that it 
does, must exist in the world prior to, and independently of, this spatio-and temporal reception. All 
that we can ever experience is ‘that which appears’, or the ‘phenomenon’, and the whole history of 
good deeds and progress, no matter how glorious, ‘resides alone in phenomena, and not the moral 
cause’ (CF, 7: 91; see also PP, 8: 360).  
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Precisely what Kant is committing himself to with his transcendental idealism is, of course, hugely 
contested. Because the notion of a timeless noumenal freedom can seem so scandalous to our 
‘modern sensibilities’, an attractive option is to construe transcendental idealism in less troublesome 
ways. Perhaps Kant really means to indicate the irreducible limitations and complexity of 
discerning reality through the observation of empirical phenomena, which limitations become 
especially pronounced when we regard the growth and formation of moral character. Alternatively, 
perhaps transcendental idealism is more of a grammatical reflection that ‘reasons’ operate in a 
conceptual space other than ‘causes’, transcendent in that they do not ‘appear’ in space and time, 
but without any spookier connotation. I associate my own work with strands of Kant scholarship 
that identify considerable continuity between his earlier rationalist metaphysics and his mature 
‘critical’ philosophyxxxv. Alongside others, I even consider the continuity of this rationalist 
metaphysics to be compatible with Kant’s own claims to have achieved, by his own lights, a new 
‘epistemic discipline’ in his later thought. Putting it briskly, the idea is that the content of much of 
what Kant believes in his early thought (God, divine creation, and non-spatial and non-temporal 
human souls) remains much the same in his later thought, but the epistemic status changes, from 
knowledge, to warranted and required (true) beliefs, arrived at on the basis of practical reason.  
 
I will try to say, next, something that exponents of a less extravagant construal of transcendental 
idealism might be able to agree with. I will then conclude the article on a more extravagant note, 
with some brief comments about the lines of justification I would explore, if space and time 
allowed. First of all, the ‘big tent’ observation: however we construe such language, Kant does 
choose to talk, a lot, continuously through the 1780s and 90s, about our fundamental non-
temporality, especially in relation to freedom and morality. This choice, however we construe it, 
subverts a progressivism about history and politics, as well as indicating a different paradigm and 
structure for ‘transcendence’, and hope, than that employed in the Christian traditions received by 
Kant.  
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On any interpretation of transcendental idealism, the need to identify progress in history is a  
‘regulative idea’, indexed not to a hidden insight into divine purposes, but, rather, arising from our 
limited cognitive abilities (CJ, 5: 397-401). Because we cannot hope to understand how sheer 
mechanism ‘that no intention has ordered’ can bring about even ‘the generation of a blade of grass’ 
(CJ, 5: 400), we find it necessary to think in terms of natural teleology, especially in the sphere of 
biology, of which, perhaps surprisingly, human history is a sub-sectionxxxvi. This is a necessity that 
goes from the micro (the internal organic constitution of the blade of grass) to the macro (the course 
of that part of mechanical organic nature that we call ‘human history’). A more gifted cognizer, not 
constrained by receiving the world spatially and temporally, might well have no need to make 
regulative recourse to something beyond mechanism, in order to understand the blade of grass, or 
human history (CJ, 5: 397-398).  
 
The hope for the ‘highest good’ in Kant’s thought has a quite different pedigree, status and destiny 
to any hope we might have for historical progress.  Kant tells us, in the third Critique, that the moral 
proof for the existence of God as the guarantor of the highest good ‘would always remain in force 
even if we found in the world’, which includes that part of nature which is human history, ‘no 
material for physical teleology at all’ (CJ, 5: 478). The seam of thought that runs from the highest 
good to God is, Kant tells us, ‘essentially different’, indeed ‘entirely independent’, from anything 
that ‘concepts of nature can contain and teach’, that is from any regulative warrant, and need, to 
ascribe teleology to nature, which includes history (CJ, 5: 478). As such, belief in the highest good , 
which is practical, and not merely regulative, has a securer epistemic status than belief in historical 
progress.  
 
The picture suggested by Kant, on the construal I am presenting, is one where history is not 
preparatory for a future moral state, but is, or might be, an emanation of a fundamental moral 
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reality. Those prepared to travel down more metaphysically committed paths of Kant exegesis, 
might say that the history of human actions, as with everything that appears, is the appearance of 
that which is fundamentally non-spatial and non-temporal, where there is no sense in which we 
move towards or further away from the noumenal dimension wherein morality resides. Everything 
that appears, all phenomena, are equidistant, equally disclosing and veiling of ultimate reality. As 
Kant puts it, ‘actions here in the world are mere Schemata of the intelligible [actions]’, where ‘these 
appearances’, the actions, are interconnected in accordance with empirical laws’, as a ‘phenomenon 
(of the character)’, where one ‘imputes’ a moral status ‘to oneself’, insofar ‘as one cognizes one’s 
own character only from the phaenomenis’ (R 5612; see also A 540/B 568; A 551/B 579). The 
category of morality cannot be used (or not straightforwardly) to describe how we appear, 
individually, collectively, or historically, but regards the ‘human being’ ‘considered as noumenon’, 
with ‘the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the highest good in the world)’ (CJ, 5: 
435; see also A 445-451/B 473-479; A 531-557/B 559-B586; E, 8: 334; Pr, 4: 343-4; CPrR, 5: 95-
102; Rel, 6:31; R, 4225, 5611, 5612; MetM, 6: 280n). For this reason, Kant emphasizes the 
invisibility of moral action, stating, for example in the Groundwork, that ‘it is absolutely impossible 
by means of experience to make out with complete certainty’ 
 
a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested 
simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one’s duty. (GW, 4: 406; see also GW, 
4: 407-410 and 4: 418; MetM 6: 447).  
 
Although we ‘cannot see through’ to our fundamental disposition (Gesinnung), we make a fallible 
‘inference’ from ‘perceptions that are only appearances of a good or bad disposition’ (Rel, 6: 71).  
 
I would submit that some of the difficulties thought to surround a more metaphysically committed 
Kant, are not, in truth, entailed or required by this position, and were not held by Kant, and should 
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not be defended as an interpretation of Kant. The exponent of the more metaphysically committed 
Kant would be well advised, in my view, to slough-off the misleading nomenclature of a ‘two-
worlds’ interpretation of Kant, which is conventionally foisted upon him or her. Rather, we find 
here, in a suggestively Platonic key, one world, but with different degrees of disclosure and 
unveiling of fundamental reality, with a conviction, which is not knowledge, but warranted practical 
belief, that fundamental reality is quite different from how it appears, although its appearance is 
nothing other than a manifestation of fundamental reality.  
 
If Kant is committed to noumenal freedom, this, in itself, by Kant’s own lights, need not exclude 
the proper study of the textures of the appearing (everywhere but nowhere in particular) of 
noumenal freedom, in disciplines such as anthropology, social science, history, and 
psychologyxxxvii. Although not widely known, Kant undoubtedly has a broad and deep interest in 
dimensions of experience studied by these disciplines (see especially APV and MetM). Such an 
interest might even be precisely what we expect of Kant, when he tells us that anthropology, for 
example, is a ‘way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior’ (APV, 7: 283). 
This is consonant with the role of appearances outlined above, as the only, albeit precariously 
limited, means by which we can make inferences about our fundamental moral character. The 
irreducible and in-principle precariousness of the medium could even motivate careful empirical 
study.  
 
I do not deny that such a conception of noumenal freedom is ‘difficult’ for us, and hardly a 
gripping, intuitive, or useful account, at least by itself, of the moral life. But some things which are 
difficult for us, might not have been so problematic for Kant, whose antennae for plausibility must 
be, to some extent, framed by his rationalist heritage, used to conceiving of the experienced world 
as a well-founded phenomenon, grounded upon a fundamentally different underlying reality. Kant 
could, by his own account, move a long way from Leibniz, but still not be ‘one of us’. 
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In Kant’s chosen association of morality with the language of non-temporality, and especially on 
the more metaphysically committed interpretation of Kant, we discover a fascinating reassertion of 
a type of undercutting and omnipresent transcendence, but in a different key to the one we find in 
the Christian tradition. Noumenal reality sustains the experienced world, and undercuts everywhere 
our confident assertions about its nature, because, as with the non-spatial and non-temporal first 
cause of classical Christianity, it is not inserted into any one place or time in particular. Only the 
total transcendence guarantees such ubiquitous immanence, and serves as a source of hope that how 
things appear is not how things fundamentally are, alongside a constant deflation of our confident 
claims at absolute knowledge. There is a difference though in the source and shape of the 
transcendence. In Augustinian Christianity, God, the creator ex nihilo, is the source, with the mode 
of unveiling being fundamentally temporal: we live in ‘this age’ (hoc saeculo), expecting in the 
eschaton to be differently temporalized in the ‘age of ages’ (saecula saeculorum), by the gracious 
action of a transcendent God. In Kant, the source of the transcendence is more our own divinity, as 
we participate in a fundamental and invisible way in a self-transcending reason, which constitutes 
the moral law. We do not hope to be ‘differently temporalized’, but rather to be, in a fundamental 
way, other than temporalized, where time is the moving image of our own eternity.  
 
In 1798, Kant asks what underlies ‘the idea’ of a political constitution ‘in harmony with the natural 
right of human beings’ (CF,  7:90). What underlies ‘all political forms’, Kant asserts, is a ‘Platonic 
ideal’, that is, as he goes onto explain, a ‘respublica noumenon’, of which we have ‘in our 
experience’, the disclosing and veiling appearance, the ‘respublica phaenomenon’ (CF, 7: 91). This 
is transcendence, but differently organized. We live not ‘in hoc saeculo’, hoping for the City of 
God. Rather we experience the ‘respublica phaenomenon’, trusting and hoping in its not-impossible 
and therefore to-be-believed-in foundation in the ‘respublica noumenon’, with the locus of our hope 
being our own ‘proper selves’ (GW, 4: 461), moral, free, invisible, everywhere acting because 
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nowhere in particular. The ‘respublic noumenon’, Kant insists, is not ‘an empty figment of the 
brain’, but ‘rather the eternal norm for all civil organization in general’ (CF, 7: 91). The Christian 
theologian might not find in Kant’s thought theology’s ‘other’, the secular, but, perhaps, another 
theology, for whom the ‘secular’ (this time) is not fundamental.  
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